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Contractual agreements between smallholder farmers and agribusiness compa-
nies have gained in importance in many developing countries. While produc-
tivity and income effects of contracting in the small farm sector were analyzed
in many previous studies, labor market and employment effects are not yet well
understood. This is an important research gap, especially against the background
of continued population growth and structural transformation. Here, we inves-
tigate the effects of two types of contractual agreements between large interna-
tional processing companies and smallholder farmers on agricultural labor use,
household labor allocation, and hired labor demand in Ghana’s palm oil sector.
We use cross-sectional survey data and a willingness-to-pay approach to con-
trol for unobserved heterogeneity between farmers with and without contracts.
We find that agricultural labor intensity is substantially reduced through the
contracts, because contracting in Ghana is associated with the adoption of labor-
saving procedures and technologies. Simple marketing contracts lead to reallo-
cation of the saved household labor to off-farm employment, whereas resource-
providing contracts lead to a stronger reallocation of labor within the farming
enterprise. Household labor is more affected by labor savings than hired labor.
KEYWORDS
agricultural labor use, child labor, contract farming, gender, oil palm, rural employment
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1 INTRODUCTION
Contract farming has gained in importance in many
developing countries, with agribusiness companies con-
tracting small- and medium-scale farmers (Bellemare,
2018; Meemken & Bellemare, 2020; Otsuka, Nakano,
& Takahashi, 2016; Ton, Vellema, Desiere, Weituschat,
& D’Haese, 2018). Contract farming has positively
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contributed to income gains in the small farm sector and
to broader agricultural development in many situations
(Otsuka et al., 2016). However, the effects of contract
farming on agricultural labor markets and employment
are not yet sufficiently understood. Depending on the
situation, contract farming can lead to higher farm labor
demand andmore labor-intensive agricultural production,
or it can also contribute to on-farm labor savings, and
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thus promote structural transformation with labor shifts
from agriculture to other sectors. Here, we investigate
the effects of contracts between large processing compa-
nies and smallholder farmers on agricultural labor use,
including household labor and hired labor, in Ghana’s
palm oil sector. This is an interesting empirical example,
because international palm oil companies are increasingly
investing in Africa, so that the search for socially-inclusive
business models is important from a rural development
policy perspective (Byerlee, Falcon, & Naylor, 2017; Qaim,
Sibhatu, Siregar, & Grass, 2020).
Many studies analyzed the effects of contracts on agri-
cultural productivity and income in the small-farm sec-
tor (e.g., Ashraf, Giné, & Karlan, 2009; Barrett et al., 2012;
Khan, Nakano, & Kurosaki, 2019; Mishra, Kumar, Joshi, &
D’Souza, 2016; Ragasa, Lambrecht, & Kufoalor, 2018; Rao,
Brümmer, & Qaim, 2012; Ruml & Qaim, 2020). Possible
effects of contracts on agricultural labor use receivedmuch
less attention in the empirical literature. This is surpris-
ing, because agricultural labor use, household labor alloca-
tion, and hired labor demand are all important aspects of
household welfare, rural development, and broader struc-
tural transformation.
The few available studies that analyzed labor market
effects suggest that contracting leads to additional labor
use in farm production, harvesting, and postharvest han-
dling (Benali, Brümmer, & Afari-Sefa, 2018; Meemken
& Bellemare, 2020; Neven, Odera, Reardon, & Wang,
2009; Rao & Qaim, 2013). However, we argue that these
results cannot be generalized, because contracting can also
involve the adoption of labor-saving technologies and pro-
cedures. Labor-reducing effects through contractswere not
shown previously in a small-farm context. Here, we show
that they exist in Ghana’s palm oil sector.
In particular, using data from a survey of farm house-
holds, we investigate the effects of two types of contracts—
namely, marketing and resource-providing contracts—on
labor use in oil palm production. While farmers with-
out a contract do some of the postharvest handling them-
selves, farmers with a contract sell the oil palm fruit
bunches to the buying company immediately after har-
vest. Some of the contracted farmers also use labor-saving
chemical inputs, such as herbicides, thus further reduc-
ing labor intensity. We quantify the effects of contract-
ing on total labor use per unit of land and investigate the
resulting implications for household labor allocation and
hired labor demand. In addition, we differentiate between
male, female, child, and youth labor. Differentiation is
useful to better understand possible broader social impli-
cations. Endogeneity issues in the evaluation of effects
are addressed through including farmers’ willingness-to-
pay (WTP) for certain contract features as an additional
explanatory variable in the regressions, which is a useful
approach to control for possible unobserved heterogeneity
(Bellemare & Novak, 2017).
Contract farming in Ghana’s palm oil sector is not a
peculiar case. Many smallholders in Africa have tradition-
ally produced palm oil for home consumption and local
markets. However, demand for palm oil fromdomestic and
international markets is growing, so that modern supply
chains with new actors and smallholder contract schemes
are increasingly emerging in Africa (Byerlee et al., 2017).
Similar trends are also observed in other crops tradition-
ally grown by smallholders. Against this background, bet-
ter understanding the labor market implications of con-
tract farming is particularly important.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. The next
section presents further details of trends in Africa’s palm
oil sector, including a description of traditional and mod-
ern supply chains. Section 3 describes the data collection
and the statistical methods, Section 4 presents and dis-
cusses the empirical results, while Section 5 concludes.
2 BACKGROUND
Over the last few decades, international demand for palm
oil increased tremendously. This led to a substantial rise in
the area under oil palm cultivation, particularly in South
East Asia (Byerlee et al., 2017). In West Africa, where oil
palm actually originates, production levels stagnated in
recent decades (Huddleston & Tonts, 2007). This situation
is now gradually changing. In South East Asia, the land for
future oil palmexpansion is limited andproduction growth
increasingly conflicts with tropical rainforest conservation
objectives (Qaim et al., 2020). Hence, to meet the further
rising international demand, palm oil companies have also
started to invest in Africa. In Ghana, the area under oil
palm increased from 160,000 hectares in the year 2000 to
over 370,000 hectares in 2018. During the same period,
national production volumes rose from 1 million tons to
2.6 million tons of fresh fruit bunches (FAO, 2019). Similar
trends are also observed in other West African countries.
Oil palm is already one of the most important cash crops
produced in West Africa and substantial further growth is
expected in the future (Byerlee et al., 2017; Rhebergen et al.,
2016).
The transformation of oil palm from a local semisubsis-
tence crop, which it was for centuries in Africa, to a major
cash crop is associated with supply chain modernization
and the entry of large processing companies. In Ghana,
the location of company-owned palm oil plantations and
processing facilities is primarily determined by land con-
cessions that the companies obtain from the Ghanaian
government. Some of the palm oil that the companies pro-
cess is produced on these company-owned plantations. In
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TABLE 1 Production and marketing characteristics in oil palm with and without contract
Traditional, without contract Marketing contract Resource-providing contract
Buyer Local customers, small processing
mills
Processing company Processing company
Product sold Oil palm fruits, palm oil Oil palm fruit bunches Oil palm fruit bunches
Production assistance None None Inputs, technologies, technical
support on credit
Labor operations Plot maintenance (m) Plot maintenance (m) Plot maintenance (m)
Input application (m) Input application (m) Input application (m)
Harvesting (piecemeal) (m, f) Harvesting (at once) (m, f) Harvesting (at once) (m, f)
Picking of fruits (m, f, c, y)
Processing (m, f)
Marketing (m, f)
Notes: (m) indicates that the operation is typically performed by adult males. (f) indicates that the operation is typically performed by adult females. (c) and (y)
indicate that children and youths are also involved occasionally.
addition, the companies procure oil palm fruit bunches
from surrounding smallholder farmers through contrac-
tual agreements. Smallholder farmers continue to be the
main producers of oil palm in West Africa. In Ghana,
smallholder production accounts for 75% of total palm
oil supply (Byerlee et al., 2017). Smallholder palm oil
producers are also an important employer in Ghana, pro-
viding jobs for several hundred-thousand farm workers
(Manley & Leynseele, 2019; Ministry of Food and Agricul-
ture, 2011).
To this point, five large national and international palm
oil processing companies procure their supply from con-
tracted smallholders in Ghana, but the sector is evolving.
Many smallholders still produce palm oil for traditional
local markets without any contracts, whereas new compa-
nies and contract schemes are emerging, largely depending
onwhere the government provides additional land conces-
sions. The production and marketing conditions between
traditional supply chains without contracts and modern
supply chains with contracts differ remarkably. In tradi-
tional supply chains, farmers have no secure sales market.
They harvest the fruit bunches and then pick the individ-
ual fruits out of the bunches, in order to sell to local cus-
tomers or home process to palm oil. Picking, processing,
and finding a buyer are time-intensive operations. As the
quantities traded in local markets are small and the fruits
are perishable, harvesting in traditional supply chains typ-
ically takes place in a piecemeal fashion.
In contrast, farmers inmodern supply chainswith a con-
tract have a secure sales market where prices are fixed
annually. Contracted farmers harvest the bunches, but
instead of picking the individual fruits out of the bunches
and processing themselves, they sell the bunches to the
buying companies at the farm gate. In other words, the
labor-intensive postharvest operations are no longer car-
ried out on the farm. The companies have large mecha-
nized mills where the fruit bunches are processed. Com-
pared to the home processing of palm oil, and the small
local mills that continue to use manual techniques (Byer-
lee et al., 2017), larger mills produce at higher process-
ing capacities of 20–30 tons per hour. This means that
farmers in modern supply chains with a company contract
can harvest and sell larger quantities of fruit bunches at
once.
InGhana, two types of contracts exist in the palm oil sec-
tor, namely, marketing and resource-providing contracts,
as shown in Table 1. For both types of contracts, the har-
vest and sales conditions are as described above. However,
the contracts differ in terms of the additional assistance
provided for production inputs and technologies. While
farmers with a marketing contract do not receive produc-
tion assistance, farmers with a resource-providing contract
can obtain planting material, chemical inputs, other pro-
duction tools, and technical support on credit from the
contracting company. This credit is paid back through a
share of the harvest and the commitment to sell to the con-
tracting company. Thus, in addition to providing a secure
sales market, the resource-providing contract addresses
farmers’ financial constraints through interlinking output,
input, and credit markets. Farmers producing under mar-
keting contracts and farmers without contracts are not
involved in such market interlinkages.
The described differences between traditional and mod-
ern supply chains lead to the expectation that contract
farming has a labor-saving effect on oil palm production
at the smallholder level. Whether this is really observed
empirically is analyzed below. The expected reduction
in agricultural labor intensity raises additional questions.
Farmers could either use the labor saved per unit of oil
palm land to expand the area cultivated, thus keeping the
total agricultural labor use constant, or they could real-
locate the labor saved to off-farm activities. Obviously,
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F IGURE 1 Map of study area in Ghana
Source: Authors’ own presentation using tools provided in Kahle and Wickham (2013).
expansion of the area cultivated would require access to
additional land and capital. In our study region in Ghana,
land is not the major limiting factor. In fact, most farm-
ers have more land than they actually cultivate. How-
ever, farmers typically face financial constraints to expand
the oil palm area, as new oil palm plantations are costly
to establish and only start bearing fruits after several
years.
Against this background, it is likely that marketing con-
tracts and resource-providing contracts lead to different
types of labor reallocation. As mentioned, farmers with
resource-providing contracts have access to credits for
the establishment and maintenance of oil palm planta-
tions, whereas farmers with simplemarketing contracts do
not. Indeed, another recent study using the same survey
data showed that resource-providing contracts contribute
to higher smallholder production investments and larger
areas cultivated with oil palm, whereas simple marketing
contracts do not have such effects (Ruml & Qaim, 2020).
Effects on labor use and labor reallocation were not ana-
lyzed previously but will be evaluated here.
In particular, we investigate the effects of both types of
contracts on (a) total agricultural labor use per acre of oil
palm, (b) household labor use, (c) hired labor use, and
(d) the time worked in off-farm employment. In addition,
we disaggregate the labor use effects by gender, separating
betweenmale and female adults, and also analyze possible
implications for child and youth labor. Table 1 suggests that
both types of contracts lead to a reduction or omission of
farm operations that often also involve women, children,
and youths, so that examining effects by gender and age
can provide useful additional insights.
3 MATERIALS ANDMETHODS
3.1 Sampling strategy and farm
household survey
We conducted a survey of oil palm-producing farm house-
holds in Ghana between April and July 2018. When we
sampled regions and households for the survey, there
were a total of five large palm oil processing companies
with company plantations and smallholder contract
schemes (Figure 1). All five companies were located in the
Southern parts of Ghana. Out of the five companies, we
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purposively selected two that were located in neighboring
regions quite close to each other, namely, Benso Oil Palm
Plantation owned by Wilmar International in the Western
Region and Twifo Oil Palm Plantation owned by Unilever
in the Central Region. Benso has simple marketing con-
tracts with farmers and started the contract scheme in the
Western Region already in the 1990s. In contrast, Twifo
uses resource-providing contracts and started to work
with smallholders in the Central Region in 2008.
From both company schemes, contracted oil palm farm-
ers were selected randomly based on complete lists of vil-
lages and farmers involved. Both companies stated that
they offer the contracts to all oil palm farmers in the
selected contract villages, provided that farmers agree
to the contract conditions. This was also confirmed in
focus group discussions, which we carried out in nonsam-
pled villages prior to the actual survey.1 In contract vil-
lages, most oil palm-producing farm households were con-
tracted, and the few thatwere not sometimes still sold parts
of their harvest to the company through informal arrange-
ments with their neighbors.
Given that most farmers in the contract villages self-
selected into a contract, we could not select comparison
farmers without contract in the same villages without the
risk of serious selection bias. Nor could we select compari-
son farmers in neighboring or nearby noncontract villages
because these villages had not been selected by the com-
panies for their contract schemes, probably due to differ-
ent village or farmer characteristics. Our alternative was
to select comparison villages and farmers in a different
region located outside of the current contract area but
otherwise sufficiently similar to the contract villages and
farmers. This was possible because—as discussed above—
Ghana’s palm oil sector is evolving, and new company
plantations and contract schemes are being planned and
implemented.2
1 Focus group discussions were carried out separately with village offi-
cials (village chiefs, assembly men, lead farmers, and elder councils) and
farmers. Village officials were asked about their perception of the con-
tract farming scheme and the opportunities and challenges faced with
the contracts, whereas farmers were asked about their production meth-
ods, access to land, labor, and inputs, and personal experiences with the
contract scheme. The discussions were informal and often lasted for sev-
eral hours of debate in local languages with English translation by a local
interpreter. In total, eight focus group discussions were held: four in vil-
lages with resource-providing contracts, two in villages with marketing
contracts, and two in villages without any contracts.
2 As mentioned above, the regions and locations where company planta-
tions are established cannot be freely chosen by the companies but are
determined by where the government provides land concessions. Many
of the recent concessions to palm oil companies were provided in the
southern parts of Ghana, where our study is also located. Around the con-
cession land for the company plantations, companies can select villages
where they want to contract smallholder farmers. Villages are typically
With the help of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture
(MoFA), we identified a suitable comparison area in the
Ashanti Region also in the southern part of Ghana, where
the conditions are very similar, no contracting existed at
the time of the survey, but a new contract scheme was
about to start.3 MoFA provided us with a list of villages in
the Ashanti Region that had already been selected for the
upcoming contract scheme. From this list, we randomly
sampled villages and oil palm-producing farm households.
The focus group discussions confirmed that farmers in
these comparison villages were not aware of the upcom-
ing contract scheme at the time of the survey, which was
advantageous for us to collect comparable data from oil
palm farmers in traditional supply chains without com-
pany contracts.
Our strategy to sample farmers with and without con-
tracts in different (neighboring) regions (Figure 1) has pros
and cons. On the pro side, it reduces or avoids selection
issues within each region. On the contra side, there is per-
fect correlation between contract schemes and regions, so
if the regions differ systematically, it would be difficult to
know whether differences in the outcomes are due to dif-
ferences in contracts or regional characteristics. We tried
to minimize the possibility of systematic regional differ-
ences. All three regions—Western, Central, and Ashanti—
are located inGhana’s green belt, which is classified as suit-
able for oil palm cultivation (Rhebergen et al., 2016). The
three regions have very similar rainfall and temperature
conditions (TableA1 in the onlineAppendix).Nor are there
systematic regional differences in terms of soil quality and
irrigation (Ruml & Qaim, 2020).
In addition to agroecological factors, we also compared
the three regions in terms of various economic and social
indicators, such as mean income levels, human develop-
ment, and employment rates, which could possibly influ-
ence the labor market effects of contract farming. For all
these indicators, we do not observe systematic regional dif-
ferences (Table A1). This is also in line with our microlevel
observations and the focus group discussions in all three
regions. Of course, we cannot rule out completely that cer-
tain unobserved regional differences exist, so that some
caution is warranted. We explain below how we try to
control for observed and unobserved heterogeneity in our
regression models.
In total, we randomly selected 463 oil palm-producing
farm households from 31 villages in the three regions: 193
from the Western Region with a marketing contract, 164
chosen based on distance, infrastructure conditions, and the number of
oil palm-cultivating households.
3 In other parts of the Ashanti Region, contract schemes of palm oil com-
panies already existed at the time of the survey (Figure 1).
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from the Central Region with a resource-providing con-
tract, and 106 from the Ashanti Region without any con-
tract. For the structured survey, personal interviews were
carried out with the head of each of the sampled house-
holds in the local language, using a questionnaire devel-
oped for this purpose and programmed into tablet com-
puters. The questionnaire captured information on the
household structure, all income sources, the time spent
by householdmembers in various economic activities, and
other socioeconomic details. Input–output details for oil
palm productionwere captured at the plot level for all plots
managed by the sample household. We use complete data
for 524 oil palm plots, after excluding those that did not yet
bear any fruits. In addition to the household interviews, we
also conducted shorter structured interviewswith the chief
in each of the villages, capturing information on village-
level characteristics.
3.2 Regression models
In a first step, we estimate the effects of contract farming
on labor use in oil palm farming with a regression model
of the following type:
𝑌𝑖ℎ𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐶𝑖ℎ𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑃𝐶𝑖ℎ𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖ℎ𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖ℎ𝑗, (1)
where 𝑌𝑖ℎ𝑗 is total labor use per acre of oil palm on plot
𝑖, in household ℎ, and village 𝑗. 𝑀𝐶 represents the mar-
keting contract and 𝑅𝑃𝐶 the resource-providing contract;
these are dummy variables taking a value of 1 if the house-
hold and plot are part of the respective contract scheme
and 0 otherwise.4 Thus, 𝛽1 measures the effect of the mar-
keting contract and 𝛽2 the effect of the resource-providing
contract. A negative and statistically significant coefficient
would indicate that the respective contract reduces total
labor use per acre of oil palm. We also control for other
factors that may influence labor use in oil palm farming
through the vector 𝑋𝑖ℎ𝑗 , which includes plot, household,
and village characteristics. 𝑢𝑖ℎ𝑗 is a random error term that
we cluster at the village level.
In a second step, we estimate disaggregated models
using household labor and hired labor per acre of oil palm
as separate dependent variables. As there are some farmers
who do not use both types of labor, the dependent variables
in thesemodels include zero observations leading to corner
solutions. This is accounted for by modeling two decisions
for each type of labor as follows:
4MC and RPC are possibly endogenous, which could lead to biased esti-
mates. We discuss endogeneity issues and how we address them further
below.
𝐷𝑖ℎ𝑗 = ∝1𝑀𝐶𝑖ℎ𝑗 + ∝2𝑅𝑃𝐶𝑖ℎ𝑗
+ ∝3𝑋𝑖ℎ𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖ℎ𝑗 𝜇𝑖ℎ𝑗 ∼ 𝑁 (0, 1) , (2)
𝑄𝑖ℎ𝑗 = 𝛾1𝑀𝐶𝑖ℎ𝑗 + 𝛾2𝑅𝑃𝐶𝑖ℎ𝑗





where Equation (2) models the binary decision whether
or not to use household (hired) labor on oil palm plot i,
and Equation (3) models the decision of howmuch house-
hold (hired) labor to use on this plot, conditional on the
first decision being positive. Hence, 𝐷𝑖ℎ𝑗 is a dummy and
𝑄𝑖ℎ𝑗 a continuous variable. The other variables are defined
as above. We estimate Equations (2) and (3) separately for
household labor and family labor.
In a third step, we test whether contract farming leads to
reallocation of household labor from farm to off-farmactiv-
ities. This is tested with the following equations, which are
estimated at the household level:
𝑉ℎ𝑗 = 𝜋1𝑀𝐶ℎ𝑗 + 𝜋2𝑅𝑃𝐶ℎ𝑗
+ 𝜋3𝑋ℎ𝑗 + 𝜏ℎ𝑗 𝜏ℎ𝑗 ∼ 𝑁 (0, 1) , (4)
𝑊ℎ𝑗 = 𝜑1𝑀𝐶ℎ𝑗 + 𝜑2𝑅𝑃𝐶ℎ𝑗





where 𝑉ℎ𝑗 is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if
at least one member of household h works in off-farm
employment, and 0 otherwise, whereas 𝑊ℎ𝑗 is a con-
tinuous variable measuring the number of labor days
worked in off-farm employment by all household mem-
bers. Household labor is reallocated to off-farm activities
if the coefficients 𝜋1, 𝜋2 and/or 𝜑1, 𝜑2 are positive and
statistically significant. As discussed above, differences in
labor reallocation effects betweenmarketing and resource-
providing contracts can be expected.
Moreover, we examine whether the effects are different
for male and female household and hired laborers. This
is tested by running the models in Equations (2)–(5) sepa-
rately for male and female labor and comparing the coeffi-
cients. Finally, we investigate the effects on child and youth
labor participation in the production of oil palm by reesti-
mating the models in Equations (2) and (3) with child and
youth labor as dependent variables.
We use double-hurdle specifications to estimate the
models in Equations (2)–(3) and (4)–(5). The double-
hurdle specification is suitable to estimate corner solu-
tion models with a binary first-stage decision and a con-
tinuous variable in the second stage. As such, it esti-
mates two interlinked choices: the decision to employ the
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particular type of labor (Equations (2) and (4)), and the
choice on the quantity of the type of labor (Equations (3)
and (5)) (Burke, 2009; Cragg, 1971; García, 2013). Double-
hurdle models were used recently in the agricultural eco-
nomics literature to estimate labor market effects (Benali
et al., 2018; Rao & Qaim, 2013).
The continous outcome variables in Equations (3)
and (5) are not normally distributed, which we tested
prior to estimation. Therefore, we use an exponentional
double-hurdle model, which is suitable for our variable
distributions.5 Alternatively, a tobit model using hyper-
bolic sine transformations could be employed. Hyperbolic
sine transformations are suitable transformations if the
variable includes meaningful zeros (Bellemare & Wich-
man, 2020).We test the double-hurdle specification against
the more specific tobit alternative using a likelihood ratio
test. The results reject the hypothesis that the tobit is
a suitable specificastion in all cases, meaning that the
double-hurdle model is preferred (Table A2 in the online
Appendix).
3.3 Definition of key variables
The dependent variables in the different regression mod-
els are total labor use per acre of oil palm, as well as labor
use by different categeries of laborers, including house-
hold and hired labor, male and female labor, and child and
youth labor. All these variables are measured in labor days
worked per acre of oil palm during the 12 months prior
to the survey. Laborers are considered adult if they are
18 years or older. Youth labor includes persons between
15 and 17 years of age, and child labor refers to individ-
uals that are 14 years or younger. Child and youth par-
ticipation is only counted as labor when the individuals
were actively involved in any of the agricultural operations.
Activities such as delivering food or water to other labor-
ers or simply accompanying family members without own
active involvement are not counted as labor.
Collecting data on child labor can be difficult as employ-
ing child labor is forbidden and farmers may be hesitant to
provide this information. However, the ban on child labor
applies primarily to hired child labor, which is uncom-
mon in oil palm farming in the study area. The use of
hired youth labor is also rare in oil palmproduction. There-
fore, child and youth labor in our context refers to children
and youths belonging to the farm family, for which farm-
5 The exponential double-hurdle model uses the exponential value of the
independent variables on the right-hand side instead of taking the loga-
rithm of the dependent variable on the left-hand side of the equation. The
left-hand side cannot be log-transformed, due to meaningful zeros in the
data.
ers openly provided details during the interviews. Never-
theless, we cannot completely rule out a certain reporting
bias, which should be kept in mind when interpreting the
results.
The key explanatory variables are the two dummies
for particiation in marketing and resource-providing con-
tracts, which were already explained above. In addition,
we include a set of control variables. At the plot level, we
control for soil quality, irrigation, the number of palms per
acre, the age of the palms, and the distance from the plot to
the closest road that is accessible with a truck, measured in
walkingminutes. At the household level, we control for the
number of adult household members, which is a proxy for
the availability of household labor, and the total land size.
As the current land size can be influenced by contracts,
we use land availability in 2008, which is before most of
the farmers had any oil palm contracts.6 Total land size
includes all plots available to the household for cultivation,
regardless of whether or not the plots were actually culti-
vated in 2008. Furthermore, we control for socioeconomic
characteristics of the oil palm farmer (age, sex, education,
and farming experience). In the household-level models,
we control for the characteristics of the household head,
who is not necessarily the same person as the oil palm
farmer. Finally, we control for distance to the closest mar-
ket measured in km as a village-level variable.
3.4 Dealing with potential endogeneity
We use the regression models explained above to evaluate
the impact of marketing contracts and resource-providing
contracts on labor use. However, farmers self-select into
contract participation, so that the exposure variables may
be endogenous. Some of the variables that influence con-
tract participation are observed and controlled for. But
there may also be unobserved factors that are jointly corre-
lated with contract participation and labor use decisions.
Such type of endogeneity could lead to correlation of the
contract dummy variables with the error terms and thus
bias the estimation results.
Our sampling framework helps to reduce issues of
farmer self-selection, because farmers with and without
contracts were chosen in different regions, namely, regions
that are very similar in terms of regional characteristics but
differ in terms of contract availability (see above). How-
ever, unobserved heterogeneity may still exist. To control
6 Some of the farmers with marketing contracts were already contracted
before 2008, but the marketing contracts did not affect farm investments
and the scale of production, as another recent study with the same data
showed (Ruml & Qaim, 2020). The resource-providing contracts, how-
ever, affect investments and the scale of production, and these were not
available before 2008.
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for possible unobserved heterogeneity, we include an indi-
vidual WTP measure as an additional covariate in the
regression models. Details of this approach are explained
in the following.
TheWTPmeasure captures the farmer’s subjective pref-
erence for producing under contract, which is likely cor-
related with a number of farmer and locational charac-
teristics, including unobserved ones such as risk aversion,
time preferences, entrepreneurial skills, and individual
market access. Hence, controlling for WTP in the models
will reduce possible issues caused by unobserved hetero-
geneity. UsingWTPmeasures to address endogeneity is an
approach that was also recently used in other studies eval-
uating the impacts of contracts and relatedmarketing insti-
tutions (Bellemare&Novak, 2017;Meemken&Qaim, 2018;
Verhofstadt & Maertens, 2014).
We derived the farmer’s WTP for contracts through a
simple experiment that was implemented as part of the
survey. In particular, we offered each farmer a set of hypo-
thetical contract offers requiring varying amounts of initial
investments. Respondentswere asked: “Would you bewill-
ing to enter a contract agreement with a company for the
establishment of one acre of oil palm that would increase
your income but would necessitate an initial investment of
Z Ghanaian Cedis (GHS)?” For each respondent, Z started
at a low value and gradually increased in follow-up ques-
tions.7 The highest value of Z for which the answer was
“yes” represents the individual WTP, which we include as
an additional control variable in our regressions. It should
be noted that the WTP variable itself is also endogenous
and was derived at a time when many farmers in our sam-
ple already had a contract. However, we do not use this
variable to estimate the effect ofWTP on labor use but only
to control for unobserved heterogeneity when estimating
the effects of contracting.
4 RESULTS
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics and mean difference
tests for all outcome variables used. The upper part of
Table 2 shows labor use at the plot level. As expected,
farmers with a contract use significantly less agricultural
labor in oil palm production than farmers without a con-
tract. This is true for both types of contracts, but the dif-
ference is especially large for the resource-providing con-
tract. Farmers with amarketing contract use less than half,
7We included eight initial investment amounts, ranging from 500 GHS to
4000 GHS, in steps of 500 GHS. The average initial investment amount
required for the resource-providing contract is between 3000 and 4000
GHS.However, this amount can vary substantially, depending on the type
and quantity of support the individual farmer requests on credit.
and farmers with a resource-providing contract only use
about one-third of the labor that farmerswithout a contract
use per acre of oil palm. Differences are primarily observed
for household labor, including male and female, as well as
child and youth labor. For hired labor, differences between
plots with andwithout contracts are not statistically signif-
icant. This provides a first indication that both contracts
are associated with lower agricultural labor use at the plot
level, especially lower household labor use.
The lower part of Table 2 shows the number of days
worked in off-farm employment at the household level.
For the total number of days worked in off-farm activi-
ties, no significant differences between households with
and without contract are observed. However, gender dis-
aggregation reveals that households with amarketing con-
tract have more female off-farm labor days than house-
holds without any contract. The differences in Table 2 can-
not be interpreted as effects of contracts, as the plots and
households also differ in terms of several other character-
istics (Table A3 in the online Appendix). The regression
results presented below control for differences in plot and
household characteristics and possible other confounding
factors.
Table 3 provides additional descriptive statistics on the
type of labor used in each production step. Male adults
are more involved than other household members in plot
maintenance and harvesting, while female adults aremore
involved in fruit picking and processing. The overall con-
tribution of child and youth labor is relatively small and
mostly concentrated on fruit picking and to a lesser extent
harvesting and processing. As discussed above, fruit pick-
ing and processing are operations that are no longer car-
ried out on-fam in the modern supply chains with com-
pany contracts. In terms of hired labor, male laborers
are involved in all operations, except for fruit picking
where their contribution is small. Female-hired laborers
are mostly involved in fruit picking and harvesting. Note-
worthy in Table 3 are also the large standard deviations,
indicating that a large variation in the use of household
and hired labor exists across oil palm farms.
4.2 Effects of contracts on agricultural
labor use
Table 4 shows the estimated effects of contract farming on
total agricultural labor use. The results clearly suggest that
contract farming reduces total labor use under both types
of contracts. The marketing contract leads to a reduction
of 43 labor days per acre of oil palm, which is equivalent
to a 55% decrease when compared to the mean labor use
of 78 days on oil palm plots without any contract. The
resource-providing contract leads to a reduction of 48
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TABLE 3 Labor days in oil palm production by type of labor and production step (mean values per acre)













Plot maintenance 8.59 2.17 0.11 0.33 7.89 0.00
(10.13) (5.33) (1.01) (1.83) (12.44) (0.00)
Input application 0.20 0.91 0.01 0.04 1.78 0.07
(0.11) (2.31) (0.12) (0.30) (2.00) (0.44)
Harvesting and
marketing
10.00 7.76 0.54 0.56 8.24 7.49
(13.78) (12.85) (4.57) (2.64) (12.25) (16.26)
Picking of fruits 6.74 8.41 2.34 1.61 0.05 13.10
(10.57) (10.52) (7.00) (5.07) (0.24) (29.25)
Processing 6.01 6.82 0.20 0.88 6.88 2.79
(13.93) (11.87) (2.14) (3.49) (11.30) (6.66)
Note: Mean values are shown with standard deviations in parentheses. Observations were only included if the respective production step was performed on-farm
by household or hired laborers (e.g., picking fruits and processing is not performed on-farm for contracted plots).
TABLE 4 Effects of contracts on total labor use in oil palm production





Control variables included Yes
WTP included Yes
Observations 524




labor days, equivalent to a 62% decrease. The difference
in the effects between both types of contracts is not
statistically significant.
4.3 Effects of contracts on labor
reallocation and employment
Table 5 shows the effects of contracts on labor reallocation
and employment. These estimates are based on double-
hurdle models. The results in column (1) suggest that con-
tracts reduce the likelihood of using household labor in oil
palm production by 33 and 38 percentage points for mar-
keting and resource-providing contracts, respectively. The
results in column (2) further suggest that—for those who
use household labor in oil palm production—the num-
ber of household labor days per acre is reduced by 25.2
and 30.7 for marketing and resource-providing contracts,
respectively.
The effects of both contracts on the likelihood of employ-
ing hired labor and the number of hired labor days per
acre are small in magnitude and not statistically signifi-
cant (columns (3) and (4) of Table 5). Table 6 shows uncon-
ditional marginal effects combining the results from both
hurdles. It becomes obvious that both types of contracts
significantly reduce the use of household labor, but not
hired labor.
What do households do with the household labor time
saved per acre of oil palm? The results in Table 5 sug-
gest that some of the labor saved is reallocated to off-
farm economic activities, including wage employment
and self-employment.8 While contracting has no effect
8 Off-farm wage employment includes teaching, mining, construction,
security services, and work in offices, churches, and companies, among
others. Oil palm farmers rarely work as laborers on other farms. Off-farm
self-employment mostly involves small shops and businesses in trading
and processing.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































on the likelihood of working off-farm, it significantly
increases the number of household labor days in off-farm
employment.9 This implies that households already pur-
suing off-farm activities increase the time spent in these
activities.
As expected, the effect on off-farm employment is big-
ger for the marketing contract than for the resource-
providing contract, in spite of both contracts entailing
similar savings in household labor time per acre of oil
palm. This can be explained by differences in house-
hold livelihood strategies. As mentioned, farmers with a
simple marketing contract have limited access to capi-
tal for expanding their farming business, so they reallo-
cate the labor saved per acre of oil palm primarily to off-
farm activities. In contrast, households with a resource-
providing contract have access to credit through their con-
tract, which they use to expand their oil palm area and spe-
cialize more on commercial farming, as shown by Ruml
and Qaim (2020). Hence, for farmers with a resource-
providing contract, much of the labor saved per acre is
reallocated on the farm rather than to off-farm activities.
This is also supported by the findings in Table 6, which
show no statistically significant unconditional effect of the
resource-providing contract on the daysworked in off-farm
employment.
4.4 Gender and age disaggregation for
household labor
Table 7 presents disaggregated results for male and
female household labor and for child and youth labor.
These results are also based on double-hurdle models,
as explained above. Both types of contracts significantly
reduce male and female household labor use per acre of
oil palm. The effects of both contracts on male and female
labor are similar in magnitude (the differences are not sta-
tistically significant).
The first-hurdle results in columns (5) and (7) of Table 7
further suggest that the likelihood of using child and youth
labor is reduced significantly by both types of contracts.
The second-hurdle estimates (columns (6) and (8)) also
have negative signs and are quite large in absolute terms,
especially for child labor. These second-hurdle estimates
are not statistically significant, which is probably due to
the small number of households using child and youth
labor, leading to a small number of observations and large
standard errors. Nevertheless, the unconditional marginal
9 Note that the effects of contracts on the number of labor days in off-farm
employment cannot be compared directly to the effect on the number of
days worked in oil palm, because the former is measured per household
while the latter is measured per acre of oil palm.
62 RUML and QAIM



















WTP included Yes Yes Yes
Observations 524 524 463





TABLE 7 Effects of contracts on household labor use in oil palm production, by gender and age
Male labor Female labor Child labor Youth labor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)










Marketing contract −0.30*** −12.34*** −0.33*** −11.72*** −0.15*** −32.33 −0.17*** −2.97
(0.05) (3.21) (0.06) (2.32) (0.02) (30.23) (0.04) (8.23)
Resource-providing
contract
−0.32*** −13.77*** −0.41*** −16.94*** −0.12*** −71.05 −0.10*** −13.21
(0.04) (3.68) (0.06) (2.83) (0.02) (95.56) (0.04) (29.06)
Control variables
included
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
WTP included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 524 343 524 270 524 46 524 58
Notes: Marginal effects from double-hurdle models are shown with village cluster-corrected standard errors in parentheses. The marginal effects of the second
hurdle (quantity) are conditional on the first hurdle being passed. Full results are shown in Tables A8 and A9 in the online Appendix. Unconditional marginal




effects show a significant reduction in child labor of 3.3 and
4 days per acre for the marketing and resource-providing
contract, respectively (Table A10). This is plausible, given
that children in traditional supply chains are particularly
involved in fruit picking, an operation that is no longer car-
ried out on-farm in modern supply chains with company
contracts.
Table 8 shows gender-disaggregated effects of the con-
tracts on participation in off-farm employment. For male
household members, the likelihood of off-farm employ-
ment is not significantly affected, but both contracts
increase the number of off-farm labor days of male house-
holdmembers considerably (by 105 days and 83 days for the
marketing and resource-providing contract, respectively).
This suggests that male members in households with and
without a contract do not differ in their likelihood to pur-
sue off-farm activities, but males in households with a
contract spend significantly more time in their off-farm
job. Hence, contracting seems to lead to a reallocation of
male labor days to already existing off-farm activities.10
10 It is also possible that male household members change to a different
type of off-farm activity through contracting, for instance from casual
employment to a more permanent job, in which they work more days
per year. Our data do not allow us to analyze different types of off-farm
activities in more detail.
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TABLE 8 Effects of contracts on off-farm employment, by gender
Male labor Female labor
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Decision Quantity Decision Quantity
0–1 Days per household 0–1 Days per household
Marketing contract −0.06 104.68*** 0.11** 76.95**
(0.05) (33.89) (0.05) (37.21)
Resource-providing contract −0.05 82.85** −0.02 62.98
(0.04) (37.14) (0.05) (41.26)
Control variables included Yes Yes Yes Yes
WTP included Yes Yes Yes No
Observations 463 151 463 130
Notes: Marginal effects from double-hurdle models are shown with village cluster-corrected standard errors in parentheses. The marginal effects of the second
hurdle (quantity) are conditional on the first hurdle being passed. Full results are shown in Tables A11 and A12 in the online Appendix. Unconditional marginal




TABLE 9 Effects of contracts on hired labor use by gender
Male labor Female labor
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Decision Quantity Decision Quantity
0–1 Days per acre 0–1 Days per acre
Marketing contract −0.02 1.89 0.10 0.88
(0.05) (2.67) (0.09) (1.80)
Resource-providing contract 0.11** −1.33 −0.19** −2.37
(0.05) (2.09) (0.09) (2.81)
Control variables included Yes Yes Yes Yes
WTP included Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 524 401 524 214
Notes: Marginal effects from double-hurdle models are shown with village cluster-corrected standard errors in parentheses. The marginal effects of the second
hurdle (quantity) are conditional on the first hurdle being passed. Full results are shown in Tables A14 and A15 in the online Appendix. Unconditional marginal




For female household members, the marketing contract
increases the likelihood of off-farm employment by 11
percentage points, and the number of female labor days
worked in off-farm employment by approximately 77
days.11 Wedonot find statistical evidence that the resource-
providing contract leads to an increase in female off-farm
employment.
Overall, these results indicate that the reallocation of
household labor from farm to off-farm employment is
more pronounced for male than female household mem-
bers. And the reallocation to off-farm employment is
stronger for the marketing contract than for the resource-
providing contract, which is in line with the aggregated
results above.
4.5 Gender disaggregation for hired
labor
Table 9 provides gender-disaggregated results for hired
labor. Here, we see notable differences for the two contract
types. The marketing contract has no significant effect on
11 A shift of female household labor from on-farm to off-farm activities
can have interesting implications for gender roles within the household
and for family welfare. Analyzing such aspects in more detail is beyond
the scope of this study. Another recent study with data from Tanzania
showed that female off-farm employment contributes to an increase in
female bargaining power and has non-linear effects on child nutrition
(Debela, Gehrke, & Qaim, 2020).
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the use of hired labor. In contrast, the resource-providing
contract increases the likelihood of employing male hired
labor by 11 percentage points, and reduces the likelihood
of employing female hired labor by 19 percentage points.
These results indicate a substitution of male for female-
hired labor.
The unconditional marginal effects, which are shown in
Table A16 in the online Appendix, further suggest that the
resource-providing contract reduces female hired labor use
by 3.4 days per acre of oil palm. This means that female
agricultural laborers may potentially suffer from dete-
riorating employment opportunities through resource-
providing contracts.
5 CONCLUSION
While effects of contract farming on labor use and employ-
ment were rarely analyzed in the previous research, the
few studies that exist suggest that contracting increases
labor demand for agricultural production, harvesting, and
postharvest handling (Benali et al., 2018; Khan et al., 2019;
Meemken & Bellemare, 2020; Narayanan, 2014; Neven
et al., 2009; Rao & Qaim, 2013). We have provided new evi-
dence, showing that the opposite may also be true. Using
survey data from the palm oil sector in Ghana, we have
shown that contracts reduce total agricultural labor use
per acre. The reduction is mainly observed for household
labor. For hired labor, we did not identify significant over-
all effects.
Furthermore, we have shown that some of the house-
hold labor saved in oil palm production through the con-
tracts is reallocated to off-farm economic activities. This is
in contrast to Otsuka et al. (2016) and Bellemare (2018),
who argued that contract farming may reduce small-
holder opportunities to pursue off-farm employment. In
our study, especially the households with a marketing
contract increase the number of labor days in off-farm
employment considerably. The marketing contract does
not involve any credit options, so householdswith this type
of contract are constrained in their access to financial capi-
tal, which would be needed to expand their farm business.
Hence, households with a marketing contract reallocate
the labor saved to off-farm activities.
Clearly, the effects depend on the context. Previous
studies mostly looked at contracts for horticultural crops,
which are labor-intensive and where the contracts led
to additional production and postharvest operations for
meeting specific quality requirements. This is different for
oil palm contracts in Ghana. The contracts in Ghana are
not associated with special quality requirements. Instead,
labor-intensive postharvest handling, which is necessary
when selling in traditional supply chains, falls away when
selling under contract. The contracting companies buy the
oil palm fruit bunches as harvested without any on-farm
processing.
While the concrete results presented here should not
be generalized, the finding that contract farming can
reduce agricultural labor use under certain conditions cer-
tainly holds more broadly. Due to the rising international
demand for palm oil, supply chains are being modernized
in many African countries. New types of processing tech-
nologies and contract schemes are gaining in importance.
Similar market trends are also observed for other crops tra-
ditionally grown by African smallholders.
In addition to evaluating the effects of contract farming
on total labor use, we have also disaggregated the anal-
ysis by gender and age. We have found no differences
in the effects of male and female household labor. How-
ever, some gendered substitution of operations in oil palm
seems to occur in the sense that a reduction in hired female
labor is compensated by a slight increase in hired male
labor. Disaggregation by age revealed that contracts sig-
nificantly reduce the likelihood of using child and youth
labor in oil palm. This is because children and youths
in traditional supply chains are particularly involved in
postharvest operations, which are no longer carried out
on-farm in modern palm oil supply chains with company
contracts.
A few limitations of our study need to be mentioned.
First, collecting information on farm and off-farm house-
hold and hired labor requires detailed questions and good
memories. Farmers have to recall many details over a 12-
month period, so that measurement error can occur. Cer-
tain details, such as labor inputs by children and youths,
may also be underreported deliberately by farmers. We
do not expect systematic differences in misreporting or
measurement error between farmers with and without
contracts, so that the impact directions will hardly be
affected. However, the exact numbers should be inter-
preted with caution. Second, using cross-section obser-
vational data for impact evaluation raises concerns of
endogeneity. We have tried to reduce potential endogene-
ity bias by sampling farmers with and without contracts
from regions that are as similar as possible in terms of
observable characteristics. We also included an individ-
ual WTP measure as an additional covariate to control for
possible unobserved heterogeneity. Nevertheless, overin-
terpretation in a strictly causal sense should be avoided,
as some remaining endogeneity bias cannot be ruled out
completely.
More research on the labor market effects of contract
farming under various conditions is needed. Comparing
our results with the few related previous studies suggests
that the labor use and employment effects can differ
remarkably depending on the particular context. Creation
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of decent agricultural and nonagricultural employment is
key for sustainable rural development and structural trans-
formation, especially in Africa where rural population
growth is still substantial.
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